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BOOK REVIEWS 339 
Modality, Probability, and Rationality: A Critical Examination of Alvin 
Plantinga s Philosophy, by James F. Sennett. New York: Peter Lang Pub-
lishing, Inc., 1992. Pp. xv and 192. $35.95. 
MARK S. MCLEOD, University of Texas at San Antonio. 
James Sennett's Modality, Probability, and Rationality succeeds in presenting 
an "overview and critical analysis of many of the central doctrines in the 
philosophy of Alvin Plantinga" (p. 1). Since no single book could discuss 
everything of importance in Plantinga's work, Sennett focuses on a thread 
running through most of Plantinga's work-the epistemology of religion. 
Accordingly, he includes chapters on Plantinga's God and Other Minds, the 
ontological argument, the logical argument from evil, the probabilistic argu-
ment from evil, the development of Reformed epistemology, and the more 
recent development of the notion of proper function as epistemic warrant. 
Each chapter is well organized, insightful, and, for the most part, clearly 
written. In addition to these positive general features, I found the exposition 
of Plantinga's more technical work-the ontological argument and the argu-
ments from evil-to be clear and helpful, often stating the crux of the matter 
in succinct and penetrating ways. Sennett's description of Reformed episte-
mology is well done, and his well-grounded speculations into the implications 
of Plantinga's analysis of warrant for the Reformed epistemology project are 
thought-provoking. There are some improvements Sennett might have made, 
however. I have one general comment and two more specifically philosophi-
cal comments to make. 
One mildly disappointing issue is Sennett's employment of the rubric under 
which he discusses Plantinga's position. Sennett suggests that the central 
point Plantinga wishes to make in his religious epistemology is "The 
Plantinga Thesis," namely, that "there is no plausible epistemological theory 
that rules out theistic belief as a category of epistemically appropriate belief' 
(p. 1). The disappointing thing is not the rubric itself but Sennett's sometime 
failure to tie the rubric directly into what he is discussing. This happens most 
obviously in the chapters on the problem of evil. Although in each chapter 
there are sections where Sennett attempts to connect the issues under direct 
consideration to the Plantinga thesis, a little more development of Sennett's 
overall approach would help-the approach seems a little strained. Neverthe-
less, Sennett shows that the rubric is a useful one, and true to Plantinga's 
philosophy, in his discussion of Plantinga's epistemology where the develop-
ment of the Plantinga thesis fares quite a bit better. Here it is helpful and 
more directly connected. 
Sennett's criticisms of Plantinga's various arguments are quite good. As 
I've noted, his exposition of various arguments is often penetrating. This 
enables Sennett to get directly at the problems with Plantinga's arguments, 
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where he finds them. Most problematic for Sennett are Plantinga's ontological 
argument and the Reformed epistemology project, both in its early version 
and in Sennett's construction of the project as he draws on Plantinga's recent 
work on warrant. His criticisms are careful and creative. However, I think 
they are not without difficulties. 
Sennett's position on Plantinga's version of the ontological argument in-
cludes the claim that one cannot rationally believe its premises without an 
argument that would not be an independent argument for its conclusion (pp. 
24-29, 35-36). Sennett's argument for this suggests that "there is a possible 
world in which un surpassable greatness is exemplified" (the first premise in 
Plantinga's ontological argument) cannot be rationally believed without ap-
peal (via argument) to the conclusion, "there actually exists a being who is 
omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect, and has these properties in 
every world." Any argument for the former includes an argument for the 
latter. This is true, Sennett argues, because the argument uses modal terms 
stipulated as S5 terms, so a cognizer S does not understand the propositions 
expressed by sentences utilizing these modal terms unless she understands 
that the theorems and axioms of S5 are true. In tum, S does not understand 
S5 in this way unless she understands the invariance of modality thesis-that 
possibility and necessity do not vary from world to world. From this it follows 
that if it is true in some world that maximal excellence is borne in every 
world, then it is true in every world that maximal excellence is borne in every 
world. Hence, S understands "there is a possible world in which something 
is omnicompetent (has omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection) in 
every world" only if she understands it to entail "something is omnicompetent 
in every world." Furthermore, Plantinga's argument relies on the serious 
actualist thesis that objects bear properties only in the worlds in which they 
exist. S understands "something is omnicompetent in every world" as a seri-
ous actualist thesis only if she understands it to entail "something exists in 
the actual world that exists in every world and is omnicompetent in every 
world." This last proposition is only a thinly veiled version of the stated 
conclusion of Plantinga's ontological argument, "there actually exists a being 
who is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect, and has these properties 
in every world." So, one cannot rationally believe the premises of the argu-
ment without an argument that would not be an independent argument for the 
conclusion. 
Sennett illustrates his point by suggesting that an argument from "2 + 2 = 4 
& God exists" to "God exists" is problematic in just the way Plantinga's 
ontological argument is. No good argument exists for the former that is not 
also a good argument for the latter, so no one could be rationally convinced 
of the former without being antecedently and independently convinced of the 
latter. One cannot understand "2 + 2 = 4 & God exists" without knowing that 
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it entails "God exists," since one cannot understand the premise without 
knowing the truth-functional import of "&." Sennett's criticism relies on the 
notion of "obvious entailment" which he defines in this way: "A proposition 
P obviously entails a proposition Q just in case it is impossible for a cognizer 
S to justifiably believe P and fail to be justified in believing Q." On this 
account, "if P obviously entails Q, then S's justifiably believing P and failing 
to be justified in believing Q is impossible precisely because understanding 
P is not possible without understanding that it entails Q" (p. 2). 
My question has to do with obvious entailment, deduction, and rationality. 
While it seems clear enough that there is such a thing as obvious entailment-
the intuitive cases are easy enough to grasp-isn't there a problem with the 
notion of "understanding" to which it appeals, when it is applied outside the 
more or less intuitive cases? When does the understanding involved in fol-
lowing an argument become so complex that the "obviousness" in the entail-
ment gets lost? Sennett suggests that because there is no way of understanding 
the premises of Plantinga's ontological argument without understanding the 
conclusion to be entailed by the premises, the argument cannot function as a 
good reason for the conclusion for anyone. There is, he says, an unacceptable 
epistemic circularity involved. But where, exactly, is it? And isn't there a 
similar circularity involved in all valid deductive arguments? At some point, 
doesn't one's understanding the premises of a valid deductive argument force 
one into admitting that the conclusion is entailed by them? Eventually, 
doesn't one move from not understanding to understanding? At that juncture, 
can't the argument have epistemic force that is not circular? Doesn't the 
epistemic role an argument plays in one's noetic structure have something to 
do with what one learns in coming to understand the argument? In short, what 
notion of rationality is Sennett appealing to here, and what is its connection 
with how we use deductive arguments in our being justified in holding beliefs? 
This is especially pressing given the context of Plantinga's philosophy, since 
Sennett goes on later to argue that one of the things Plantinga's version of the 
ontological argument reveals is what is wrong with all ontological arguments. 
There is much more to be said about Sennett on the ontological argument, 
but something should be said about the chapters on Reformed epistemology. 
Again, there is much to be learned from Sennett's work on Reformed episte-
mology. The exposition is clear and often excellent on getting directly to the 
points of contention. Still, at least one issue warrants further discussion. 
Sennett criticizes Plantinga's conclusion that evidentialism (the position 
that theistic beliefs must be based on propositional evidence) is false. The 
connection between the failure of classical foundationalism and evidentialism 
is not so close as Plantinga suggests. Sennett introduces what he calls "modi-
fied foundationalism" to support his view. Modified foundationalism accepts 
beliefs as properly basic if they meet classical foundationalism's criteria 
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(self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses) or meet an expanded set 
of criteria derived from "problem cases" (memory beliefs, for example). 
Problem cases have in common what Sennett calls "universal sanction," that 
is, they are typically held by virtually all cognizers, are held as essential to 
normal living, and life without them is unthinkable. For example, life without 
memory beliefs is difficult even to imagine, let alone live. Since theistic 
beliefs do not enjoy universal sanction, there is good reason to accept modi-
fied foundationalism while rejecting theistic beliefs, and hence evidentialism 
can be accepted while rejecting classical foundationalism. Universal sanction 
provides, says Sennett, prima facie reason to accept evidentialism and to 
reject the Reformed epistemology project. 
But why should universal sanction provide prima facie reason to accept 
evidentialism? Some of William Alston's arguments are relevant here. Uni-
versal engagement in an epistemic practice may indicate reliability, and hence 
justification, but that says nothing about theistic practices. They may have their 
own internal accounts-spiritual development, for example-providing prima 
facie reason for taking the practices, and by extension, the beliefs, to be justified. 
There is much more to discuss about Sennett's fine book than I can do here. 
Despite the critical issues I raise, Modality, Probability, and Rationality is 
well worth reading. In fact, it is a must for anyone interested in contemporary 
analytic philosophy of religion, particularly those interested in Plantinga's 
contributions. 
Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed 
Epistemology, by Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr. Albany, NY; State University of 
New York Press, 1991. Pp. xvii and 263. $18.95 (Paper). 
JAMES F. SENNETT, Palm Beach Atlantic College. 
For over a decade now, debate concerning the epistemology of religious belief 
has focused on the provocative arguments by Alvin Plantinga for the doctrine 
known as "Reformed Epistemology" -the doctrine that theistic belief may 
be fully justified without propositional evidence. The debate is well known. 
What is not so well known is that the historical roots of Reformed epistemol-
ogy are deep, widespread, and dialectically healthy. This is the contention of 
Dewey Hoitenga, who presents an impressive and detailed investigation into 
what he sees to be the philosophical ancestry of the doctrine. While Plantinga 
claims to draw his ideas from the work of John Calvin and his interpreters, 
Hoitenga contends that Calvin is only the tip of the philosophical iceberg. 
Below the surface lie important contributions from Plato, the Bible, and 
Augustine as well. 
